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Abstract:  This article explores the parallels between the fiduciary rule against conflicts 
of interest and the rule against bias in judicial review, with a view to providing novel 
normative insights into the purpose of the fiduciary no-conflict rule. Despite the significant 
doctrinal statements and judicial dicta highlighting the similarities between the two rules, the 
fiduciary literature has yet use this analogy to shed light on the purpose and function of the 
strict no-conflict fiduciary rule. This paper will argue that, analogous to the main purpose of 
the rule against bias, the fiduciary no-conflict rule aims to insulate the exercise of discretion 
from self-interest or other irrelevant considerations that may affect, directly or indirectly, the 
reliability and trustworthiness of the fiduciary’s decision-making process.  
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1 Introduction 
Fiduciaries and public officers have authority and discretion over the interests of others. In 
both cases, the exercise of discretion is constrained by strict rules against conflicts of interest 
and bias. The themes underlying the established rationales and objectives of these rules are 
similar: protection of the decision-making process against the risk of defective judgment, 
protection of the public confidence in the fiduciary relation or public office, and deterrence of 
the temptation of abuse discretion. Both areas use the reasonable man’s perception of a real 
possibly of conflict of interest as a benchmark for measuring compliance with these rules.  
 Over time, public law refined its approach to the optimal level of public confidence 
that the rule against bias should instil, as well as the precise element on which appearances of 
integrity and public confidence are focussed. On the former matter, it gradually recognised 
that public confidence cannot be measured against the opinion of an overly suspicious 
observer. Therefore, the language of the standard for measuring integrity progressed from 
mere suspicion to a real possibility of bias, as perceived by the fair-minded and informed 
observer. The change in language was accompanied by a change in approach to presumed 
bias and automatic disqualification for direct pecuniary interests, which shifted from the 
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‘smallest’ or ‘slightest’ pecuniary interest that could upset a suspicious observer to an interest 
that could realistically affect the decision-making process and outcome. Following this 
development, an increasingly prominent argument questions the utility of the doctrine of 
presumed bias and automatic disqualification, suggesting that these cases should be included 
under apparent bias, as measured by the fair-minded and informed observer standard. On the 
latter matter, judicial review literature increasingly recognises that the standard of fair-
minded and informed observer qualifies the concept of relevant public confidence by limiting 
objectionable conflicts to those that pose a real risk of defective judgments and inaccurate 
outcomes. In other words, it is acknowledged that the rule against bias primarily protects 
public confidence in the reliability of the decision-making process, rather than the public 
confidence in judicial and administrative decision-making in abstracto.  
 In comparison, the concept of conflict of interest is underdeveloped in fiduciary law. 
The standard by which potential fiduciary conflicts of interest are identified is analogous to 
the public law one, in terms of language and substance. What the conflict entails, however, is 
worded differently. Fiduciary literature and caselaw refer inconsistently to conflict between 
the individual interests of the fiduciary and beneficiary, or conflict between fiduciary’s 
interest and his ‘duties’ or ‘duty’. Little emphasis is placed on the relation between 
extraneous interest and defective decision-making process. De-coupling the extraneous 
interest from proper exercise of judgment has the undesirable consequence of making 
possible the argument that the no-conflict rule should be relaxed by removing fiduciary 
liability where the fiduciary demonstrably acted in good faith and the decision or transaction 
was fair to the beneficiary. A follow-up consequence is that the usual arguments against such 
relaxation are unconvincing: they are based on an imprecise and antiquated understanding of 
the rationale for the strictness of the no-conflict rule, namely discouraging rogue fiduciaries 
from defrauding their beneficiaries. This justification is too blunt in several ways. First it 
assumes a homogeneity of incentives in those receiving the disciplining signal. Second, it 
does not offer a satisfactory explanation of why interfering personal interests are a critical 
danger for fiduciary relations, even when the fiduciary’s good faith and integrity are not 
contested, and when the outcome of impugned decision ostensibly advances the interests of 
the beneficiary.  
This paper argues that fiduciary law theory could benefit from a more sophisticated 
understanding of the content and purpose of the no-conflict rule. The fair-minded and 
informed observer standard applied in judicial review of administrative decisions provides 
helpful comparative insights. By focusing on the real risk of unreliable or biased decision-
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making process, the public law standard underscores that the decision-maker’s personal 
interests are detrimental mainly because they affect the reliability of judgment in ways that 
are unpredictable and difficult to observe or measure, and not because the decision-maker is 
consciously motivated to defraud or harm the subjects of his discretion. An analogous 
emphasis on the interaction between interest and exercise of judgment could clarify the 
purpose of the fiduciary no-conflict rule and help courts in assessing the existence of 
fiduciary duties in new contexts. Too often courts address this matter using the vague 
language of trust and confidence that the beneficiary reposed in the fiduciary and that the 
courts must protect, without a careful investigation into whether the impugned decision 
involved the exercise of judgment on the interests of another. It could also provide a more 
palatable argument for why the no-conflict rule should not be relaxed in the fashion 
mentioned above. Good faith and the outcome of the decision are irrelevant not because 
ostensibly innocent fiduciaries must be punished pour encourager les autres,1 but because a 
conflicting interest biases the judgment process irrespective of the decision-maker’s desire to 
resist it and in ways that cannot be easily inferred from the outcome of the decision.     
Before making these normative statements about the relevance of the analogy 
between the two rules, two preliminary matters must be addressed. First, are the two 
doctrines really comparable? Does the public-private law divide preclude any meaningful 
comparisons? Second, is the focus on judgment and decision-making process present in the 
public law rule against bias, but nearly absent from the private law fiduciary no-conflict rule, 
an impediment to the analogy? In other words, is there an analogous judgment process 
present in private law fiduciary relations, that could underpin the analogy? Related to this 
matter, should the rule against bias be understood as relating directly to the protection of 
public confidence in the public office, or with the respect of the autonomy and dignity of the 
subjects of the discretion, without interposing its relation to the decision-making process as a 
means to the protection of public confidence?  
The paper will suggest the following answers. Regarding the first preliminary matter, 
it will make the case that the two doctrines are comparable, by invoking previous supporting 
views2 and novel historical insights.3 Regarding the second preliminary matter, it argues that 
a focus on the reliability of judgment is correct. Both rules regulate the exercise of discretion 
                                                 
1 See Remus Valsan, “Fiduciary Duties, Conflict of Interest, and Proper Exercise of Judgment” (2016) 62:1 
McGill Law Journal 1 at 1-2. 
2 Section 2. 
3 Section 3. 
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over another’s interests and use similar language that points to a shared central concern with 
the quality of the mind of the decision-maker. Fiduciary law admits, albeit with insufficient 
clarity, the centrality of judgment, discretion, and authority as indicia for the existence of 
fiduciary relations.4 Whether some of the rules and duties governing the exercise of 
judgment, discretion and powers (such as the duty to promote the best interests of the 
beneficiary, the duty exercise a power within its objective scope and for the purpose for 
which it was granted, the duty to take into account relevant considerations and exclude 
irrelevant ones, the duty not to fetter discretion, the duty to act in good faith, the duty not to 
act capriciously or irrationally, or the duty of skill, care and diligence) are fiduciary or not is 
an important and highly debated question of fiduciary law.5 For the purposes of this article, 
however, it is not essential to engage with it in detail. It is sufficient to note that some, or all, 
of these duties are binding on fiduciaries, involve exercise of judgment and discretion, and 
are thus at risk of improper performance when an actual or potential conflict of interest arises. 
As regards the methodology, the paper draws mainly on British primary and 
secondary sources.6 At times, the research draws on comparative insights from Australia, 
Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, the main insights of the paper are applicable to 
any other jurisdiction that recognises fiduciary duties or aims to introduce this concept. By 
highlighting the connection between self-interest or other vitiating factor and exercise of 
discretion over the interests of others, the paper conceptualises fiduciary duties and fiduciary 
relations using fundamental legal concepts that are stripped of historical connections with the 
English common law, thus being relevant to a wider comparative audience.  
                                                 
4 Section 5.  
5 For a detailed discussion of the application of these duties to fiduciary and non-fiduciary powers see Gerain 
Thomas, Thomas on Powers, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) Chapters 8-10. See also Lionel 
Smith, ‘Prescriptive Fiduciary Duties’ (2018) 37:2 University of Queensland Law Journal 261 (investigating the 
fiduciary nature of several prescriptive rules and duties governing the exercise of discretion, such as the duty of 
care and skill, the duty to exercise the powers for proper motives, and the duty of disclosure); Lionel Smith, 
‘Aspects of Loyalty’ (2017), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009894 (suggesting that the duty of 
care, skill and diligence and the duty of good faith may be regarded as fiduciary duties); The Hon Dyson 
Heydon QC, ‘Modern Fiduciary Liability: The Sick Man of Equity?’ (2014) 20:10 Trusts & Trustees 1006 
(arguing against the dominant narrow view of fiduciary duties, which limits these duties to the no-conflict and 
no-profit rule); Rebecca Lee, ‘In Search of the Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty: Some Observations on 
Conaglen’s Analysis’ (2007) 27:2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 327 at 337-338 (stating that fiduciary duties 
include “a (fiduciary) obligation to act solely towards the enhancement of the beneficiary’s interests, which 
obligation in neither proscriptive nor prophylactic, but prescriptive and directional”); Geraint Thomas, ‘The 
Duty of Trustees to Act in the ‘Best Interests’ of Their Beneficiaries’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 177 (arguing 
that trustees are under a foundational fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries, which 
requires them to exercise their best efforts in pursuit of the best possible result for their beneficiaries). 
6 There are no significant differences between the English and Scots law on the fiduciary no-conflict and no-
profit rules (Law Commission. 2013. ‘Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A Consultation Paper’, 
para. 1.19). Following Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357, the tests for apparent bias in 
Scotland and England are aligned terminologically and substantively (ibid. at [103]).  
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Several further caveats are apposite. ‘The rule against bias’ and ‘the nemo iudex rule’ 
are used interchangeably to refer to judicial review of administrative decisions for conflicts of 
interest. The rule against bias is discussed only in relation to the matter of impartiality of the 
decision-maker, understood as personal interests, connections or predispositions affecting the 
state of mind of the decision-maker and raising reasonable doubts about his objectivity. The 
issue of independence, in the sense of structural and institutional arrangements aimed to 
ensure impartiality (such as a public body’s constitution) is of secondary relevance and 
therefore is omitted.7 Systemic bias, denoting inclinations and predispositions resulting from 
working within a particular organisation8 is another potentially relevant concept that is not 
covered, given its closer affinity to the issue of independence. The concept of public 
decision-maker or public official are used synonymously and denote judicial or 
administrative decision-makers whose decisions are amenable to judicial review.9 Since the 
core tenets of the rule against bias apply relatively uniformly across the two categories,10 it is 
not necessary for the purpose of this paper to engage with the slight contextual differences.   
The paper builds on previous research comparing administrative and fiduciary 
discretions more generally, and the rule against bias and the fiduciary no-conflict rule in 
particular.11 It shows that the case for analogy between the two no-conflict rules is supported 
by compelling arguments. The paper does not advocate a transplant of the fair-minded and 
informed observer standard into fiduciary law. It notes the similarities between the two rules 
and their associated standards for determining potential or apparent conflicts of interest, and 
makes the case that the similarity extends to a shared core rationale of protection against the 
risk of deficient judgment process. Transfers between the two fields could indeed be 
                                                 
7 Impartiality and independence are related but distinct concepts. See Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2006] UKHL 2; [2006] 1 WLR 781 at [38], per Baroness Hale of Richmond; Matthew Groves, ‘The 
Rule against Bias’ 39 Hong Kong Law Journal (2009) 485 at 488. 
8 Dennis Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 438-439. 
9 Examples of judicial decision-makers include judges, jurors, lay magistrates or members of a tribunal. 
Administrative decisions-makers include ministers, local councillors or officers and employees of public bodies 
(Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan Moffett and Andrew Sharland, Judicial Review: Principles and Procedure (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) 8.03. 
10 Groves (n 7) at 486.  
11 On this issue, the paper draws on Matthew Conaglen, ‘Public-Private Intersection: Comparing Fiduciary 
Conflict Doctrine and Bias’ Public Law 58 (2008) 83 (describing the comparison between the fiduciary conflict 
principle and the doctrine of bias as “a worthwhile endeavour”). This paper agrees with Conaglen’s conclusion 
that the two rules have significant substantive similarities, but adopts a significantly different view on the 
meaning and rationale of fiduciary conflicts of interest. Conaglen equates fiduciary conflicts with opposition 
between extraneous interest and non-fiduciary duties, thus downplaying the significance of judgment. He 
advocates the deterrence of temptation rationale for the strict fiduciary duties, an approach critiqued in this 
paper.    
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dangerous,12 although not unprecedented,13 and should be explored only following rigorous 
and detailed consideration of the doctrines involved and the contexts within which they 
operate.14 More generally, the article does not aim to draw and exhaustive comparison 
between the legal regimes governing the exercise of fiduciary discretions and the exercise of 
judgment by public decision-makers. Thus, matters such as the principal-agent problem, the 
doctrine of reasonableness, the relevance of disclosure and informed consent, or the 
availability of particular remedies (such as rescission for mistake), while relevant to a broader 
comparison between the two areas, are not directly relevant to the scope of this paper and 
consequently will not be addressed. 
 
2 Comments and dicta supporting the analogy between public and private law rules on 
the exercise of discretion  
 
Fiduciary duties arise in legal relations where one party undertakes to perform an act or a 
service in the interests of another (usually the other contracting party), and acquires 
discretionary power or authority to decide on the best means to serve this purpose.15 
Fiduciary relations are pervasive across private and public law. They arise in established (or 
per se) contexts, such as agent-principal, trustee-beneficiary, solicitor-client or director-
corporation. All contexts in which fiduciary duties have been analysed involve loyalty, in the 
sense of strict adherence to the promotion of the other-regarding interests. Although centuries 
old, fiduciary duties continue to be surrounded by controversies regarding their nature and 
function. Numerous authors have attempted to elucidate these points by comparing and 
contrasting the private law and the public law contexts in which they arise. This section will 
highlight the main arguments and statements supporting a close analogy between fiduciary 
discretions in private and public law.   
Before reviewing the supporting precedents, it should be noted that analogies between 
private law and public law rules on exercise of discretion are at times met with 
circumspection or simply rejected. In Abacus Trust v Barr, for instance, Lightman J 
                                                 
12 James Goudkamp, ‘The Rule against Bias and the Doctrine of Waiver’ Civil Justice Quarterly 26 (2007) 310 
at 327.  
13 See the discussion of Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17; [2015] 4 All ER 639 in the following 
section. 
14 Conaglen (n 11) at 61. 
15 Remus Valsan, ‘Fiduciary Duties’ in Alain Marciano and Giovanni Ramello, eds, Encyclopedia of Law and 




acknowledged a limited scope for analogy, but warned that there are “critical differences 
between public, or administrative, law and private law proceedings”.16 In Pitt v Holt, 
Mummery LJ commented that analogies between liability in private law for breach of 
fiduciary duties and judicial review of discretions in public law “are unhelpful and 
unnecessary”. 17 The authors of Underhill and Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees 
warn that allowing an analogy between review of trustees’ of powers and review of 
administrative discretion will open the gates to introducing incompatible administrative law 
principles into trust law.18 Similarly, Davern warned that the mere coincidence of 
terminology between exercise of discretion by trustees and public authorities is an 
insufficient basis on which to draw substantive similarities between the two areas.19 From the 
public law side, Goudkamp argued against transplants into judicial review of private law 
concepts, such as waiving the right to abject to a conflict of interest or bias.20  
Other authors adopted a more nuanced view. Fox-Decent used the private law 
fiduciary theory to construct a vision of the state as fiduciary, exercising public powers for 
the purpose of securing and administering legal order. However, he pointed out that an 
important difference between the two fields resides in the beneficiary of the fiduciary duties: 
while private law fiduciaries must act for the benefit of discrete beneficiaries, in public law 
fiduciary duties are owed to a wide range of beneficiaries, from the public at large to an 
individual who appeals to an administrative tribunal.21 Nevertheless, he further noted, public 
decision-makers could be regarded as a fiduciaries owing duties of fairness and 
reasonableness to the individuals subject to their powers and to the public at large, instead of 
the traditional private law fiduciary duties of loyalty. This view is supported by Miller and 
Gold who distinguish between fiduciary service mandates, which involve administration of 
the affairs or property of identifiable persons, and fiduciary governance mandates, which 
involve administration for particular private or public law purposes.22 
                                                 
16 Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch); [2003] Ch 409 at [29]-[30]. 
17 Pitt & Anor v Holt & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 197 at para. 235 
18 David Hayton, ed., Underhill and Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed. (London: LexisNexis, 
2010) 904.  
19 Raymond Davern, ‘Impeaching the Exercise of Trustee’s Distributive Discretions: ‘Wrong Grounds’ and 
Procedural Unfairness’ in David J. Hayton, ed., Extending the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced 
Funds (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 437 at 454. 
20 Goudkamp (n 12) at 326-327. 
21 Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
152. 
22 Paul B. Miller and Andrew S. Gold, ‘Fiduciary Governance’ William & Mary Law Review 57 (2015) 513. In 
governance relations fiduciaries are engaged to promote certain abstract purposes, as opposed to fiduciary 
service mandates, which involve the administration of interests of discrete beneficiaries.   
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At the other end of the spectrum, numerous arguments can be found in favour of the 
analogy. However, supporting observations tend to be made at a high level of abstraction, 
often accompanied by cautionary statements about the primacy of context and underlying 
idiosyncratic values. The judicial dicta in support of the analogy are numerous. In the recent 
decision in Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd,23  the UK Supreme Court confirmed that contractual 
discretions (category which includes many instances of fiduciary discretions) and public law 
discretions are governed by analogous rules, which justifies the transplant into private law of 
the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness developed in judicial review of administrative 
action.24 Lady Hale, writing the majority opinion, highlighted the “obvious parallel” between 
cases where a contract assigns a decision-making function to one of the parties and cases 
where a statute assigns a decision-making function to a public authority.25 She concluded that 
both limbs of the Wednesbury test apply to contractual discretions via a contractual implied 
term.26 The reasonableness test imposes a duty “to exclude extraneous considerations [and]… 
to take into account those considerations which are obviously relevant to the decision in 
question.”27 However, Lady Hale stopped short of a wholesale transplant into private law of 
the Wednesbury doctrine by conceding that “it is unnecessary to reach a final conclusion on 
the precise extent to which an implied contractual term may differ from the principles 
applicable to judicial review of administrative action.”28 
The transplant of Wednesbury unreasonableness doctrine is supported by a long track 
record of comments and dicta highlighting the similarities between the two instances of 
exercise of discretion. In Sherarson v Maclaine, Webster J rejected the premise that the 
public law rules of judicial review and private law rules on review of powers are different, 
and the ensuing assumption that the former cannot be imported into the later: “that premise, 
and the assumption to which it leads, is false”.29 In Edge v Pensions Ombudsman, Chadwick 
LJ, writing the unanimous decision, highlighted the terminological similarity of the concepts 
used in the review of discretions in private and public law:  
                                                 
23 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17; [2015] 4 All ER 639. 
24 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. Although Braganza 
did not involve the exercise of a fiduciary discretion, the Wednesbury test applies a fortiori to fiduciary 
contractual or non-contractual discretions. 
25 Ibid. at [19]. 
26 Ibid. at [30]-[32]. 
27 Ibid. at [29]. 
28 Ibid. at [32]. On the facts of the case, Hale LJ concluded that the decision-maker (BP) failed the Wednesbury 
test by reaching a decision without taking certain relevant matters into account (ibid. at [42]). 
29 Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 570 at 625. 
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“It seems to us no coincidence that courts, considering the exercise of discretionary 
powers by those to whom such powers have been entrusted (albeit in different 
contexts), should reach similar and consistent conclusions; and should express those 
conclusions in much the same language.”30  
 
Similarly, in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman,31 after cautioning against false 
analogies,32 Lord Woolf MR noted the “marked similarities”33 between private fiduciaries 
and public authorities, the latter being “in very much the same position as they would be if 
they had fiduciary powers conferred upon them.”34 In Socimer v Standard Bank, Rix LJ 
argued that the Wednesbury unreasonableness test applies to contractual discretions, which 
are governed  
“as a matter of necessary implication, by concepts of honesty, good faith, and 
genuineness, and the need for the absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity 
and irrationality... Reasonableness and unreasonableness are also concepts deployed 
in this context, but only in a sense analogous to Wednesbury unreasonableness.”35  
 
The parallels between fiduciary and public discretions are also recognised by academic 
commentators. In his treatise on private law powers, Thomas observed that the principles 
governing the exercise of powers or discretions by trustees are similar to the public law 
principles applicable to the exercise of discretion by public authorities. Thus, a public 
authority must exercise discretion within its objective limits, in good faith, having regard to 
all relevant considerations and without being swayed by irrelevant considerations.36 Thomas 
concluded that, contextual differences aside,  “the underlying principle of review remains 
common to all cases, namely that it is some flaw in the decision-making process itself that 
may be open to challenge and not the merits of the decision itself.”37 Beatson suggested that, 
                                                 
30 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [2000] Ch 602 at 628. However, the Court of Appeal declined to consider the 
analogy further: “[It is] unnecessary to consider, in the present case, how far an analogy between the principles 
applicable in public law cases can or should be pressed in the different context of a private pension scheme.” 
(ibid. at 630). 
31 Equitable Life v Hyman [2000] EWCA 4; [2002] 1 AC 408. 
32 Ibid. at [17]. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. at [18].   
35 Socimer International Bank Ltd (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 116, [2008] 
Bus LR 1304. See also Byng v London Life Association Ltd [1990] Ch. 170; Second Consolidated Trust v 
Ceylon and Amalgamated Tea and Rubber Estates Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 567. 
36 Geraint W. Thomas, Thomas on Powers (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) 36. 
37 Ibid. at 367. 
10 
 
in certain contractual contexts, contractual discretions are subject to “common law principles 
of procedural propriety (ie fairness or natural justice), Wednesbury reasonableness (or 
rationality), bona fides, propriety of purpose, and relevancy.”38 Oliver remarked that the no-
profit rule binding on trustees “provides a parallel with the rule against bias in judicial 
review”39 and argued that the similarities between the two fields show that both categories 
“form part of a legal framework for the control of power which is not by any means confined 
to public law.”40 More recently, in a detailed analysis of the no-conflict rule and the rule 
against bias, Conaglen showed that the fiduciary rule on conflicts of interest and the rule 
against bias share common features with regard to methodology, underlying rationales and 
remedial considerations.41 
Support for the analogy comes from the public law side as well. In Prescott v 
Birmingham Corporation42 Jenkins LJ, stated that local authorities owe to local tax-payers 
fiduciary duties analogous to those of trustees, and thus cannot use public funds to subsidise a 
scheme for free travel for senior citizens.43 In Bromley London Borough Council v Greater 
London Council,44 a case which also involved the powers of a local authority to reduce 
transport fares, Lord Wilberforce referred to “a duty of a fiduciary character to its 
ratepayers”45, which the local authority breached by failing to hold the balance between the 
transport users and the ratepayers.46 In Charles Terence Estates Ltd v Cornwall Council,47 
Kay LJ reviewed these cases and concluded that “there is no doubt that this line of authority 
establishes that some decisions of local authorities will amount to a breach of fiduciary duty 
or of a duty analogous to a fiduciary duty.”48  
Similar statements can be found in other jurisdictions as well. In Australia, Finn 
observed that, given the close resemblance between a fiduciary office-holder49 and the public 
                                                 
38 Jack Beatson, ‘Public Law Influences in Contract Law’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman, eds, Good 
Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 263 at 269. 
39 Dawn Oliver, ‘Review of (Non-Statutory) Discretions’ in Christopher Forsyth, ed., Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 307 at 310. 
40 Ibid at 312. 
41 Conaglen (n 11) at 58. However, he acknowledged that the bias law concepts of independence and 
impartiality do not have direct equivalents in fiduciary law (ibid. at 77-78). 
42 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation [1955] 1 Ch 210; [1954] 3 All ER 698 
43 Ibid. at 235-236. 
44 Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768. 
45 Ibid. at 815B. 
46 Ibid. at 820D. Similarly, Lord Diplock concluded that the scheme was “a breach of the fiduciary duty… ultra 
vires and therefore void” (Ibid. at 830F). 
47 [2012] EWCA Civ 1439 [2013] 1 WLR 466. 
48 Ibid. at [17]. However, central government does not owe fiduciary duties to the body of taxpayers (Peter 
Cane, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 176). 
49 Established fiduciary positions (especially trusts) are often described as offices. See e.g. Gary Watt, Trusts 
and Equity, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 321: (“Insistence on exemplary fiduciary propriety 
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official, the legal regime of fiduciary powers reflects “in a very large measure” the judicial 
review of administrative decisions.50 In another text, he noted that “in the realms of 
government… fiduciary power is the most pervasive, the most intense.”51 More recently, 
Finn stated that, under Australian law, there is no principled reason against treating public 
officers and employees as fiduciaries, bound by the same proscriptive no-conflict and no-
profit rules as their private law counterparts.52 Sir Anthony Mason wrote that administrative 
law “from its earliest days, has mirrored the way in which equity has regulated the exercise of 
fiduciary powers.”53 Similarly, Ryan underlined that “there can be little room for controversy 
[regarding] the close analogy between the role of the modern public official and of a 
fiduciary.”54 In Canada, Macdonald noted that the administrative decision-maker “acts no 
differently than a trustee administering a trust indenture.”55 Fox-Decent argued that, given the 
“obvious similarity” between fiduciary and public powers, fiduciary theory is helpful in 
understanding the most important doctrines and practices of administrative law.56 
Furthermore, a growing body of literature, developed mainly by North-American scholars, 
uses this analogy to create a fiduciary theory of government, where political discretion is 
constrained through rules of judicial review modelled after private law fiduciary duties.57 The 
                                                 
encourages other persons in positions of trust to fulfil requirements of their office.”); Thomas Lewin, A 
Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees, 2nd American ed. (Philadelphia: T & J W Johnson, 1858) 
454: (“[I]f the trustee were allowed to perform the duties of the office, and to claim compensation for his 
services, his interest would be opposed to his duty”). 
50 Paul D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1977) at 6. See also ibid, at 14 (“This 
resemblance is not an inconsequential one… [T]he actual obligations imposed on a fiduciary in the exercise of 
his discretions mirror to a large degree the obligations imposed on the public officer in exercising his.”); Paul D. 
Finn, ‘Public Officers: Some Personal Liabilities’ Australian Law Journal 51 (1977) 313 (noting that public 
officers who are neither employees nor Crown servants are subject to public law rules that are analogous to 
fiduciary law). Sir Robert Walker, ‘The Limits of the Principle in Re Hastings-Bass’ King’s Law Journal 22 
(2002) 173 at 174 (“There is an obvious and unsurprising similarity between the grounds on which a decision by 
trustees may be attacked and the grounds on which official decision-making is subject to control by judicial 
review”). 
51 Paul D. Finn, ‘The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State’ in Equity: Issues and Trends (Annandale, 
NSW: Federation Press, 1995) 131 at 132. 
52 Paul D. Finn, ‘Fiduciary Reflections” in Paul Finn, Fiduciary Obligations: 40th Anniversary Republication 
with Additional Essays (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2016) 356 at 360. 
53 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law 
World’ Law Quarterly Review 110 (1994) 238 at 247. 
54 K. W. Ryan, ‘Commentary’ in Equity: Issues and Trends (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 1995) 152 at 
152. 
55 Roderick Macdonald, ‘On the Administration of Statutes’ Queen’s Law Journal 12 (1987) 488 at 493. 
56 Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
151-152. See also Evan Fox-Decent and Evan J. Criddle, ‘The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights’ Legal 
Theory 15 (2009) 301 (arguing that a state’s assumption of sovereign administrative powers places it in a 
fiduciary relationship with its people, and human rights emanate from this fiduciary relationship). 
57 See e.g. Evan J. Criddle, ‘Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking’ Texas Law Review 88 (2010) 441 (drawing an analogy between federal officers and private law 
fiduciaries); Evan J. Criddle, ‘Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law’ UCLA Law Review 54 (2006) 117 
(stating that the core fiduciary law concepts of entrustment, residual control and fiduciary duty increasingly 
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core insight that this political theory borrows from private law fiduciary theory is “that the 
use of discretionary power over the material, practical and legal interests of others must be 
constrained by obligations meant to align the interests of agents and principals”.58 This view 
is supported by judicial dicta. In Driscoll v Burlington, for instance, Vanderbilt CJ of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey observed that public officials “stand in a fiduciary relationship 
to the people whom they have been elected or appointed to serve” and “are under an 
inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity.”59 
These examples show that there is extensive judicial and doctrinal support for a close 
analogy between fiduciary positions and public offices. By definition, both roles involve 
exercise of authority and discretion that affect or promote other-regarding interests and 
purposes. In both cases, discretion is constrained by analogous procedural rules aimed to 
prevent abuse, unreasonableness and the risk of interference of personal interest. In both 
cases, the procedural rules guiding the exercise of discretion serve an important instrumental 
function, by ensuring that the decision-maker’s mind is properly applied to the exercise of 
discretion at hand, and is not encumbered in a way which will prevent him from reaching the 
right outcome. The similarities between the two doctrines are significant, and go beyond 
mere coincidence of terminology. A brief historical insight into the evolution of some of the 
concepts behind the two rules provides additional arguments in support of this view. 
 
3 Historical insights: natural justice, nemo iudex in causa sua and auctor in rem suam  
 
The similarities between the rules governing the exercise of discretion in both fields may be 
justified from a historical perspective as well. Oliver surmised that the conceptual similarities 
                                                 
capture the “deep structure” of administrative law and the transition from “the glacial evolution of constitutional 
precepts to the flowering of statutory standards for agency discretion”. Ibid at 136); Benjamen Franklen Gussen, 
‘The State Is the Fiduciary of the People’ Public Law (2015) 440 (describing the relationship between the state 
and its subjects as analogous to the private law trust and arguing for an overarching fiduciary duty of the state 
deriving from the nature of social relations and the high ethical standard of conduct expected from public 
servants); D. Theodore Rave, ‘Politicians as Fiduciaries’ Harvard Law Review 126 (2013) 671 (making the case 
for treating political representatives as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty); David L. Ponet and Ethan J. 
Leib, ‘Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy’ Boston University Law Review 91 (2011) 1249 
(discussing the application of private law fiduciary duties to elected political leaders). For a critical discussion of 
these theories in the US literature see Seth Davis, ‘The False Promise of Fiduciary Government’ Notre Dame 
Law Review 89 (2014) 1145. 
58 Ethan Lieb, David Ponet and Michael Serota, ‘Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships’ in Andrew S Gold 
and Paul B Miller, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
388 at 388. 
59 Driscoll v Burlington – Bristol Bridge 86 A2d 201 at 221 (1952). See also Metro Wash Airport Auth v 
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise Inc 501 US 252 at 272 (1991) (the administrative state is “in its 
own way … the people’s … fiduciary for certain purposes.”). 
13 
 
between equitable and judicial review of exercise of powers could be explained by Lord 
Greene’s extensive influence in both areas. In her view, Lord Greene, an established trust and 
equity lawyer, drew “clearly from the principles applied by equity in controlling the exercise 
of discretion by trustees and company directors”60 to develop the law on judicial review, 
notably the Wednesbury unreasonableness test.61 However, as Conaglen observed, the 
relevant principles have much older origins.62 Earlier connections may be found in the 
decisions of Lord Eldon, who was instrumental in the development of the fiduciary conflict 
doctrine as well as the notion of public trust. Lord King LC may be another connecting point, 
given his seminal fiduciary law decision in Keech v Sandford63 and his concern with 
unauthorised profits from public office.64 
 An aspect that up to now has received little attention is the principle against being 
judge in one’s own cause, as a shared antecedent of the two modern rules. In current legal 
theory, the maxim nemo iudex in causa sua is regarded as one of the pillars of natural 
justice.65 Until the eighteenth century, natural justice lacked a precise meaning - it was often 
used interchangeably with natural law, natural equity, eternal law, the laws of God, and other 
similar expressions,66 to refer to “the natural sense of what is right and wrong.”67 
Subsequently, natural justice acquired a more restricted meaning. It has been used as a 
compendious phrase to refer to two main rules governing the exercise of discretion by 
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers: nemo iudex in causa sua, or the rule against bias, 
addressing conflicts of interest, and audi alteram partem, or the fair hearing rule, addressing  
opportunity to be heard before a making a decision.68 These rules were first applied to 
proceedings in courts of justice, which presupposed a tripartite process involving two 
opposing litigants and a neutral third party adjudicator.69 By the 1960s, the safeguards of 
natural justice were extended to contexts that did not involve a tripartite setting, such as 
                                                 
60 Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
21-22.   
61 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. 
62 Conaglen (n 11) at 65.  
63 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
64 Joshua Getzler, ‘Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations’ in Andrew Burrows and Alan 
Rodger, eds, Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 577; 
Conaglen (n 11) at 65. 
65 Hedley H. Marshall, Natural Justice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1959) 5; Paul Jackson, Natural Justice, 2nd 
ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1979) 5-7. 
66 Marshall, supra 65 at 6. 
67 Voinet v Barrett (1885) 55 LJQB 39 at 41, per Lord Esher MR. 
68 Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322 at 337, per Lord Denning MR; Michael Supperstone, James 
Goudie and Paul Walker, Judicial Review, 4th ed (London: LexisNexis, 2010) 328. 
69 Peter Cane, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016) 344. 
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decisions by administrative and other public decision-makers, whether judicial or not,70 or 
exercise of discretion in certain private law contexts.71 As the bias and fair hearing rules 
expanded to include a great range of decision makers, they became more flexible. Courts and 
commentators repeatedly stressed that the application of the rules must take into account the 
particular features of the decision-maker and wider circumstances to which they are 
applied.72 Nevertheless, it is recognised that the rule against bias is less context-sensitive than 
the fair hearing rule.73 
The recent expansion of the rule against bias across public and private law contexts74 
is more a rediscovery of its universal application than a modern innovation. Early sources 
describe it as “a general rule of law”75, “founded upon nature itself”76 and known to all legal 
systems. It is commonly thought that it reached its peak in the early seventeenth century, 
when being a judge in one’s own cause was regarded by English courts as “against right and 
justice and against natural equity.”77 In Dr Bonham’s Case, Chief Justice Coke went so far as 
to say that the court could declare an act of Parliament void if it made a man a judge in his 
own cause, or was otherwise “against common right and reason”.78 In Mersey Docks Trustees 
v Gibbs, Lord Blackburn asserted that “it is contrary to the general rule of law, not only in 
this country [England] but in every other, to make a person judge in his own cause.”79 By the 
                                                 
70 Ibid. at 345; O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL); R v Chief Constable of South Wales Ex p Thornhill 
[1987] IRLR 313 (CA); R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers Ex p. Guinness Plc [1990] 1 QB 146; R v 
Holderness BC Ex p James Roberts Developments Ltd (1993) 66 P & CR 46; R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment Ex p Kirkstall Valley Campaign Ltd [1996] 3 All E.R. 304. 
71 The private law contexts include trade unions, professional bodies, or private clubs (Madeleine Cordes, 
Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings, 14th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) at 10-02. In these 
contexts, the need to observe the principles of natural justice is often found to arise via an implied term in a 
contract between the parties (ibid. at 10-03). 
72 Cane (n 69) at 345; Groves (n 7)at 486. 
73 Cane (n 69) at 346. An aspect of this more uniform application is the single test used to determine the 
incidence of bias, that of the fair-minded and informed observer.  
74 See examples mentioned in Section 2 above. 
75 Steward Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Awards (Dublin: J. Stockdale, 1791) 42 (“It is a general rule of law, 
founded on the first principles of natural justice, that a man cannot be judge in his own cause.”) 
76 John Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, vol.1 (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1773) 45 (“It is a rule founded 
on nature itself, that no man ought to judge in his own cause; and it holds, though the judge have only a partial 
interest in the cause…”). 
77 Day v Savadge (1614) Hob 65; 80 ER 235 at 235. 
78 Dr Bonham’s Case 8 Co Rep 113b at 118a. See also Earl of Derby’s Case (1613) 12 Co Rep 114; 77 ER 
1390; Brookes v Earl of Rivers (1655-69) Hardes 503; 145 ER 569; Wood v Mayor & Commonalty of London 
(1701) Holt K.B. 396. See also Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 376; Groves (n 7) at 487; George Devenish, ‘Disqualifying bias. The 
Second Principle of Natural Justice - The Rule against Partiality or Bias (Nemo Iudex in Propria Causa)’ 
Journal of South African Law 3 (2000) 397 at 397. 
79 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, (1886) LR 1 HL 93 at 110. See also Gibbons v Bishop of Cloyne, Holt 599 at 
600 (“Lastly, here the bishop was both judge and party, which is not to be allowed by any law in the world”). 
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1860s, the requirement that judges act without any real likelihood of bias became 
unequivocally established.80  
In private law relations, the nemo iudex maxim was often used to convey the 
prohibition of self-help. The interdiction to act as judge in one’s cause meant that no person 
was allowed to take justice in his own hands. According to Yale, the current Latin 
formulation of the prohibition of being judge in one’s own case was coined by Sir Edward 
Coke.81 Coke laid down this phrase in his comments on section 212 of Littleton, concerning 
self-help for damages caused by straying cattle, where commented that “it is against reason, 
that if wrong be done [to] any man, that he thereof should be his own judge.”82 In other cases, 
the principle was used to express the idea that an interested party is never a competent 
decision-maker in a matter involving judgment or discretion. In Hall v Harding, for instance, 
it was held that the number of cattle that a commoner is allowed to pasture is a matter that 
requires exercise of judgment, which cannot be determined by another commoner who has an 
interest in the matter.83 Lord Stair explained that, in decisions requiring the application of the 
general principles of the law of nature to particular cases, “the bias and corruption of interest” 
may lead to errors of judgment.84 Similarly, Locke stated that ignorance and bias of self-
interest prevent humans from learning and applying the law of nature to particular cases.85 
                                                 
80 Harry Woolf et al., De Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 11-004 - 11-005. 
Conaglen (n 14) at 72. 
81 David E.C. Yale, ‘Iudex in Propria Causa: An Historical Excursus’ Cambridge Law Journal 33 (1974) 80 at 
80. 
82 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Law of England, vol. 1, 15th ed. (London: E. and R. 
Brooke, 1794) 229. See also Jacob Giles, A Treatise of Laws: Or, A General Introduction to the Common, Civil, 
and Canon Law (London: T. Woodward, 1721) 315 (“The person letting to hire may expel his tenant by 
authority of the judge, before the term is expired. This must be by authority, if the tenant resisteth, for no man 
ought to judge in his own cause”); Sir Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Law of England 
(London: E. & R. Brooke, 1797) 102-103 (“Aliquis non debet esse judex in sua propria causa… [N]o private 
revence [should] be taken, nor any man by his owne arme or power revenge himselfe”). The language of no 
judge in own cause appears in Doctor and Student several times, as an argument against self-help in case of 
damages. See Christopher Saint German, The Doctor and Student: Or, Dialogues between a Doctor of Divinity 
and a Student in the Laws of England, 18th ed. (Dublin: James Moore, 1792) 124-125 (“I agree that he may not 
take upon him to be his own judge, and to come to his duty against the order of the law”). 
83 Hall v Harding (1769) 4 Burr 2426 at 2431 (“It is unnecessary to give any opinion as to the commoner’s right 
of distraining where the number is absolutely certain… [W]hen the question depends upon a collateral fact, or 
upon a matter of judgment, the party interested can never be a competent judge in his own cause.”) 
84 James Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 3rd ed., Book 1 (Edinburgh: G. 
Hamilton and J. Balfour, 1759) 9 (“[T]hough equity be very clear in its principles and its thesi, yet the deduction 
of reason further from the fountain, through the bias and corruption of interest, may make it more dubious in 
hypothesi, when it comes to the decision of particular cases in all their circumstances”). See also Johannes 
Sleidanus, A Famouse Cronicle of Oure Time, Called Sleidanes Commentaries (London: Ihon Daye, 1560) 61 
(“Again not only the laws written, but also the law of nature printed in men’s minds, shows that no man ought to 
be judge in his own cause. For we be all faulty and blinded with the love of our selves”). 
85 John Locke, Of Civil Government: The Second Treatise (Rockville: Wildside Press, 2008) 76. 
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As these sources show, by the eighteenth century, the interdiction to be judge in one’s 
own cause was an established legal principle applied in a variety of public and private law 
contexts. Despite its widespread application, there is little certainty about the core rationale 
behind this prohibition.86 However, in certain contexts, a link can be observed between this 
prohibition and a fair and reliable exercise of discretion or judgment. The idea that personal 
interest affects the reliability or trustworthiness of judgment may have been associated with 
the Roman law equivalent of nemo iudex. Section 2.2 of the Theodosian Code, entitled “No 
person shall be judge in his own cause” (Ne in sua causa quis iudicet) states that this 
prohibition was established in 376 CE by a joint decree issued by emperors Valens, Gratian 
and Valentinian: “We decree with sweeping generalization that no person shall act as judge 
for himself.”87 The official interpretation of this text underlines that the reason why a person 
cannot be judge in a matter in which he is interested is the same reason that prohibits a person 
to be witness in a case where he has an interest: “Our regulation shall constrain all men that 
no man may be judge of his own case, because just as no man can testify for himself, so he 
cannot act as judge for himself.”88 One is hard pressed to find detailed explanations of the 
prohibition to testify for oneself in Roman law. More recent sources suggest that a personal 
interest in the testimony may bias the witness’ judgment, rendering it unreliable and 
untrustworthy. In one of the earliest English treatises on the law of evidence, Sir Geoffrey 
Gilbert pointed out that the prohibition of being witness in one’s own cause is justified by the 
fact that, due to the shortcomings of human nature, the testimony of a witness who has an 
interest in the outcome of the case is unreliable due to “the nature of human passions and 
actions”.89 Blackstone made similarly elusive comments on the prohibition of a spouse to 
                                                 
86 According to Yale, the typical context in which the principle was applied in medieval times in common law 
concerned the validity of royal grants of jurisdictional franchise to various grantees, such as religious houses, 
boroughs, universities or individuals. The main question was whether the king could enable a man to decide a 
case in which he was concerned because he was lord of the franchise in which the cause of action arose. The 
main problem was not the proper exercise of judicial powers, but what judicial powers could be properly 
conferred or claimed (Yale (n 81) at 84-85). 
87 The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, translated by Clyde Pharr 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952) 39-40. These provisions were restated in Justinian’s Code 3.5.1: 
No one shall be judge in his own cause; and Justinian’s Digest 22.5.10: No person is deemed to be a competent 
witness in his own cause. 
88 Ibid. at 40.  
89 Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence, 3rd ed. (London: His Majesty’s Law Printers, 1769) 122-123 
(“[T]he general rule is, that no man can be a witness for himself… [F]or men are generally so short-sighted, as 
to look at their own private benefit which is near to them, rather than to the good of the world, that is more 
remote; therefore from the nature of human passions and actions, there is more reason to distrust a biased 
testimony than to believe it.”). 
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testify for the other spouse, noting that one of the reasons of this rule is that “it is impossible 
for their testimony [to be] indifferent”.90  
These texts offer conjectural evidence in support of the idea that the need to maintain 
the appearance of objective and unbiased judgment might have been one of the reasons 
behind the nemo iudex rule. The same could be inferred about the strict no-conflict fiduciary 
rule. The connection between nemo iudex and the fiduciary no-conflict rule can be 
conceptualised at two levels. At a general level, it is likely that nemo iudex influenced the 
early jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery as part of the broader set of principles of natural 
law or natural justice. As Joseph Story commented, early chancellors “acted upon principles 
of conscience and natural justice, without much restraint of any sort.”91 It can be contended 
that, when chancellors explained that a person in a fiduciary position cannot be in a situation 
of conflict of interest since no person can be judge in his own cause, they were invoking the 
need to ensure that fiduciaries’ judgment is, and appears to be, reliable and unbiased. York 
Buildings, a foundational fiduciary law decision, links the two rules directly: “The ground on 
which the disability or disqualification rests [i.e. the rule against self-dealing], is no other 
than that principle which dictates that a person cannot be both judge and party.” 92 In Re 
Skeats’s Settlement, the donees of a fiduciary power granting them authority to appoint “any 
other person” as trustee exercised the power to appoint themselves. Kay J held that, since the 
power was fiduciary in character, the exercise of discretion was invalid based on “[t]he 
universal rule is that a man should not be judge in his own cause.”93 
At a more contextual level, nemo iudex can be connected with the fiduciary no-
conflict rule via the auctor in rem suam concept. Scottish texts, in particular, trace the origins 
of the fiduciary no-conflict rule in the Roman law rule that prohibited a tutor or curator to be 
auctor in rem suam.94 In Roman law, the expression was used to refer to a procedural 
incompatibility. If a suit arose between a tutor and his ward, the tutor could not stand in court 
                                                 
90 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books, vol. 1, 12th ed. (London: A. 
Strahan and W. Woodfall, 1793) 443 (“[I]t is impossible for their testimony [to be] indifferent…; and therefore, 
if they were admitted to be witnesses for each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, ‘nemo in propria 
causa testis esse debet’”).  
91 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 1, 14th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1918)  
21. See also Sir Duncan Mackenzie Kerly, An Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1890) at 101; Dennis Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the 
Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) 219-263. 
92 York Buildings Company v Mackenzie (1795) 8 Brown PC 42 at 63. 
93 Re Skeats’s Settlement (1889) 42 Ch D 522 at 527. He added: “Naturally no human being can be imagined 
who would not have some bias one way or the other as to his own personal fitness.” (ibid.) 
94 A popular early translation was “one who acts for his own behoof”. See John Trayner, Latin Phrases and 




both in his name and as representative of the ward.95 Until the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Scottish lawyers applied the auctor in rem suam principle solely in the context of the 
actions of tutors in connection with the estates of their wards.96 Starting with the works of 
Erskine, this rule was expanded to any person occupying a fiduciary position. At the same 
time, the rule was no longer restricted to a procedural incompatibility. It was interpreted as 
encompassing a general interdiction of using such position for its holder’s benefit, for the 
same reason as the interdiction to be judge or witness in one’s own cause. Erskine 
commented that curators can be auctores in rem suam “no more than they can be judges or 
witnesses in their own cause.”97 Other sources confirm the association between the fiduciary 
no-conflict rule (expressed as auctor in rem suam) and the nemo iudex rule. Fraser, for 
instance made the similar point that a person occupying a fiduciary position is prohibited 
from engaging in transactions with himself, or be auctor in rem suam, just as no person can 
be judge in his own cause.98  
Within the scope of this paper, only a cursory and fragmentary examination of the 
historical links between nemo iudex and the fiduciary no-conflict rule is possible. 
Nevertheless, this examination reveals that judges and commentators stated that fiduciary 
conflicts of interest are not allowed for the same reason as the interdiction to be iudex in 
causa sua, or to act auctor in rem suam (which is closely related to nemo iudex). The 
contexts in which these comparisons arose suggest that both served the purpose of preventing 
situations in which judgment appears to be unduly influenced by extraneous considerations, 
which, in turn, may have enabled fairer and more accurate decisions and strengthened the 
confidence in the decision maker. Consequently, nemo iudex and auctor in rem suam could 
be regarded as further arguments in support of the two main propositions advanced by this 
                                                 
95 The Institutes of Gaius sets forth this rule as follows: “Because the tutor could not be plaintiff in his own suit 
[in re suam auctor] another was appointed under whose authority it was necessary to carry on the suit.” (Gaius 
1.184, in Frederick Tomkins and William G. Lemon, transl., The Commentaries of Gaius (London: 
Butterworths, 1869) 183. 
96 John Blackie, “Enrichment and Wrongs in Scots Law” (1992) Acta Juridica 23 at 43. 
97 John Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland:  In the Order of Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions of That 
Law, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1773) 123, emphasis added. Later, the courts confirmed that auctor in rem 
suam applied universally to any fiduciary. See Aitken v Hunter (1871) 9 M 756 at 762 per Lord Neaves (“It 
appears to me that from first to last the rule of the law of Scotland has been that any one holding a fiduciary 
character, whether that of guardian or trustee, cannot lawfully become auctor in rem suam… That doctrine is 
derived from the civil law… It is a sacred rule.”).  
98 Patrick Fraser, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland Relative to Parent and Child and Guardian and Ward, 2nd 
ed. (Edinburgh: t. & T. Clark, 1867) 279 (“A principle applicable to all offices of trust of this kind, and more 
especially of guardianship, is this, that the person acting with such deputed power… shall not be auctor in rem 
suam… It is just as incompetent for him to do this as it would be for a person to be judge in his own cause.”). 
See also James Avon Clyde, transl., The Jus Feudale by Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: 
William Hodge, 1934) 292 (“It is a principle which knows no exception that no man can make the law to suit 
himself [nemo sibi jus dicere] or be the author of his own rights [nemo sui juris auctor esse potest]”).   
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paper, namely that (i) the rules against conflicts of interest in fiduciary and administrative law 
have common origins and serve analogous purposes, and (ii) both rules are mainly procedural 
and instrumental, in the sense of promoting the likelihood of accurate outcomes by removing 
risks of defective or unreliable decision-making processes.  
 The following sections will highlight the main features of the two conflict of interest 
rules, and emphasise their main substantive similarities: centrality of judgment and 
discretion; an aim to protect the public confidence by prohibiting objectionable appearances 
of conflict; and the use of a reasonable possibility of conflict test to identify apparent or 
potential conflicts of interest. The comparison shows that the justification for the rule against 
bias recognises explicitly the connection between self-interest or other vitiating factor and 
unreliability of judgment, an insight that is nearly absent from fiduciary law. The fiduciary 
no-conflict rule, in contrast, is bedevilled by a mistaken  understanding of the notion of 
conflict of interest. The tendency to focus on the opposition of interests between the fiduciary 
and the beneficiary, as opposed to interference of vitiating interest with reliability of 
judgment and thus accuracy of decisions, obscures the rationale for the strictness of the rule, 
and enables an argument for relaxation to be developed. It is submitted that, in light of the 
multiple similarities between the two rules, a deeper understanding of the relation between 
interest and judgment, similar to that exiting in public law, could bring more coherence into 
the fiduciary law conceptual framework, as well as a renewed appreciation of the importance 
of the traditional strictness of the no-conflict rule.       
 
4 The rule against bias  
 
The rule against bias posits that a decision-maker must not be influenced by interest, 
prejudice or partiality in reaching his decision. In other words, not only must the decision-
maker not benefit himself, he must not harbour strong preconceived views about the decision 
at hand, and must not favour one party or disfavour the other.99 These negative states of mind 
are encapsulated in the concept of bias. At the outset, it should be noted that the literature on 
the rule against bias is much less concerned with the decision-maker’s opportunism or 
temptation to promote his own interest, financial or otherwise, at the detriment of the subjects 
of this discretion, compared to the literature on the fiduciary no-conflict rule. At common 
                                                 




law, it was laid down that bias was not to be presumed in a judge, who swore to administer 
impartial justice.100 The fair-minded and informed observer, who is called upon to evaluate 
an apparent bias, is aware of the fact that decision-makers are often under oath to respect the 
law, and are subject to strict ethical and professional standards of conduct.101 Although these 
safeguards are not sufficient to exclude all legitimate doubt, the default assumption is that 
“[t]here is usually no reason to suspect a breach of any obligation by anybody.”102 
Consequently, concern with deliberate fraud, opportunism and self-serving temptations fades 
into the background. A situation of apparent bias becomes objectionable mainly because of 
the potential tug, often subconscious, that the vitiating factor may have on the decision-
maker’s mind. This allows for a clearer link to be developed between exercise of discretion 
and judgment, which is the central function of the decision-maker, and intruding extraneous 
considerations. In contrast, as discussed below, the mainstream view on fiduciary duties 
stresses the decision-maker’s temptation to abuse his position, thus obscuring the intimate 
link between self-interest and risk of unreliable (albeit honest) judgment.   
 
4.1 The concept of bias  
 
Bias is a state of mind that renders a decision-making process less reliable. Courts have 
consistently described bias as a factor, predisposition or attitude of mind103 unconnected with 
the merits of the issue104 that interferes with the decision-makers’ identification and 
evaluation of relevant evidence and considerations.105 The biasing factor tilts the decision in 
                                                 
100 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768) (Buffalo: William S. Hein, 1992) 361; 
Brooks v Earl of Rivers (1668) Harders 503 (chamberlain of Chester not disqualified from hearing action in 
which his brother in law was a party).  
101 Auburn et al (n 9) at 8.52; 8.59. 
102 John Gardner, “The Mark of Responsibility (With a Postscript on Accountability” in Michael W. Dowdle 
and Michael W Dowdle, eds, Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 220 at 241 
103 Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] WLR 700 per Phillips LJ (“Bias is an attitude 
of mind which prevents the judge from making an objective determination of the issues that he has to resolve.”) 
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“a predisposition or prejudice against one party’s case or evidence on an issue for reasons unconnected with the 
merits of the issue”). 
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favour of one of the parties, or inhibits the decision-maker from evaluating relevant evidence 
with an open mind.106  
The human mind is prone to a multitude of errors of reasoning that could lead to false 
outcomes and unfair treatment.107 Not all errors of reasoning or factors external to the merits 
of the case fall within the ambit of the rule against bias. What amounts to a biasing factor is a 
contextual matter, fixed demarcations being futile as well as dangerous.108 When an 
impermissible factor arises, it either actually influences a decision or judgment, or it is 
perceived to pose such a risk. The distinction between the impermissible factor and the 
biasing effect is critical. The existence of the factor must be proved as a fact on the balance of 
probabilities, but its operative biasing effect is presumed.109  
A decision may always be invalidated if actual bias on the part of the decision-maker 
is proved.110 Actual bias is a predisposition, based upon fear, affection, favour or ill-will, to 
decide in a particular way, rather than upon a proper and balanced consideration of the true 
merits of the issue.111 Actual and conscious bias automatically disqualifies112 and may not be 
capable of waiver.113 Proof of actual bias, however, is likely to be very difficult,114 short of 
an admission of fault by the decision-maker or an express public statement of bias. Even 
when an express admission is available, it is likely to be disregarded, since courts are not 
bound to accept any such statements at face value.115 Moreover, judges cannot be compelled 
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to give evidence as to the considerations that they took into account in reaching decisions.116 
An obligation to give evidence would be inconsistent with the policy of expressing all 
pertinent reasons within a self-contained opinion.117 A decision where a sufficiently serious 
possibility of bias has been established may be quashed without the need to investigate 
further the existence of actual bias. 
Pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision, which is the main concern of the 
fiduciary no-conflict rule, is, under the rule against bias, a factor that triggers automatic 
disqualification. The rule of automatic disqualification for financial interest has a long 
lineage in British law. In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal, the House of Lords held that the 
Lord Chancellor was disqualified due to the considerable shareholding in one party to the 
proceedings. Although the Chancellor’s integrity was not doubted,118 the rule that no one is to 
be a judge in his own cause (which includes having a financial interest in a party to the 
proceedings), was “held sacred”119 and applied strictly. The rule was held sacred for many 
years, in the sense that the ‘smallest’ or ‘slightest’ direct pecuniary interest was sufficient to 
disqualify automatically, as it diminished the public confidence in the ability of the decision-
maker to decide the case purely on its merits.120  
 Over time, however, this rigid concern with removing any suspicion of impropriety 
was relaxed. A de minimis exception was introduced, which excludes financial interests that 
cannot realistically be regarded as interfering with the decision-making process and 
outcome.121 The recognition of this de minimis exception highlights that the main concern of 
prohibiting financial self-interest is the likelihood of such an interest interfering with the 
reliability and trustworthiness of decision-making process, rather than trust in the public 
office tout court. Thus, automatic disqualification too turns on the possibility that the judge’s 
decision process may be affected, or perceived to be affected, by his interest.122 As a result, 
commentators increasingly question whether there is any need for the doctrine of automatic 
disqualification, arguing that cases where it applies would be better considered under the test 
                                                 
116 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 at 249, per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest (HL). Giannarelli v Wraith 
(1988) 165 CLR 543 at 574, per Wilson J. 
117 Goudkamp (n 12) at 313. 
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had in this concern” (Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Cas 759 at 793, per Lord Campbell).    
119 Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Cas 759 at 785. 
120 R v Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230 at 232; R v Camborne Justices ex p Pearce [1954] 2 ALL ER 850 at 853. 
121 Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451 at [8]-[10]. 
122 Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice 3rd Ed (London: Sweet & 
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for apparent bias, which links impermissible factors with the decision-making process.123 
Some have argued that disqualification for interest and disqualification for bias effectively 
converged into one strand, with no significant differences between presumed bias and the test 
of a real likelihood or possibility of bias.124 This de facto convergence recognises that the key 
question in a claim of bias is not the form an interest might take but the effect it might have 
on the decision-making process.125 This is essential for understanding the instrumentalist 
account of the purpose of the rule against bias: the core concern of this rule is the effect of the 
impermissible factor on the decision-making process and thus on the accuracy of the 
decision. Protection of higher-order values, such as respect of the autonomy and dignity of 
the subjects of the discretion is also an important objective, but it is one that the rule against 
bias serves indirectly, as part of a broader set of procedural safeguards.126  
 
4.2 The test for apparent bias  
 
Given the difficulties of establishing the existence of real or actual bias, and of measuring its 
adverse effects on the decision-making process, bias law focuses on the appearance of bias. 
Various tests have been developed to establish the limits beyond which the appearances of 
bias become reprehensible.127 The initial test, based on suspicion of bias was very strict. An 
extreme version of this test held that judges must be free from even unreasonable suspicions 
of bias.128 The more established form of the suspicion test was that of a reasonable suspicion 
of bias.129 It was based on the famous passage in R v Sussex Justice ex p McCarthy, where 
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Lord Hewart CJ stated that “it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done… Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an 
improper interference with the course of justice.”130  
In R v Gough, Lord Goff of Chieveley argued that it was unnecessary to have recourse 
to a test based on mere suspicion or reasonable suspicion, for the purpose of ensuring that 
justice is seen to be done.131 He proposed instead a test based on “a real likelihood, in the 
sense of a real possibility, of bias” on the part of the decision-maker.132 Lord Woolf 
explained that examining the existence of bias beyond a real likelihood is neither desirable 
nor useful because “courts have long recognised that bias operates in such an insidious 
manner that the person alleged to be biased may be quite unconscious of its effect.”133 
Moreover, as Lord Goff explained, the decision-maker’s good faith belief that he is acting 
impartially is irrelevant: bias is an “insidious thing” that may unconsciously affect the mind 
of the decision-maker.134  
The “reasonable likelihood of bias” standard did not carry the day. In Re Medicaments 
and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) the English Court of Appeal adjusted the test to a 
“reasonable apprehension of bias”, which was more consistent with the requirements of 
European law.135 The House of Lords endorsed this adjustment in Porter v Magill, and linked 
it with the fair minded observer who takes account of the circumstances of the case at 
hand.136 The fair-minded observer is assumed “to have access to all the facts that are capable 
of being known by members of the public generally”.137 The decision in Porter did not, 
however, provide any significant guidance on how much the fair minded observer should be 
taken to know,138 and became subject to criticism from courts139 and commentators.140 
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Notwithstanding these controversies and continuing uncertainties, the Porter test reinforces 
the connection between public confidence and the risk of compromised decision-making 
process highlighted in Gough. As the House of Lords stated in Lawal v Northern Spirited Ltd, 
the “public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key”.141 The test is met 
when appearances lead to a reasonable inference that extraneous factors may have influenced 
the decision process, as opposed to investigating “what is in the mind of the particular judge 
or tribunal member who is under scrutiny.”142 
This insight into the effect of bias on the decision-maker’s mind is essential for 
understanding the purpose of the rule against bias, irrespective of the actual wording of the 
test for apparent bias. The concern with the insidious effects of extraneous factors appears in 
numerous other decisions. In R v Barnsley Licensing Justices, Devlin LJ commented that 
“[b]ias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not 
actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, nevertheless, he 
may have allowed it unconsciously to do so.”143 Bias is hard to detect and measure because it 
interferes, unconsciously, with the proper identification and weighing of relevant and 
irrelevant considerations. In R v Inner West London Coroner, Sir Thomas Bingham explained 
that bias creates the risk “of having caused the decision-maker, albeit unconsciously, to 
weigh the competing considerations, and so to decide the merits, unfairly.”144 In Locabail, 
Lord Bingham CJ explained that bias calls into question the decision-maker’s ability “to 
ignore extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections and bring an objective 
judgment to bear on the issues before him.”145  
Coupled with a default assumption of probity and honesty,146 the insight that 
extraneous factors (including material self-interest) may tug subconsciously on the decision-
maker’s mind evidence a core concern with the quality of the decision-making process, rather 
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than with the decision-maker’s actual motives or with the level of trustworthiness that the 
public office inspires more generally. Thus, the rule protects the integrity of the decision-
making process and, indirectly, maintains the public confidence in the administration of 
justice. Whether these two outcomes are on equal footing or one is subordinated to the other 
is a matter of debate between the dignitarian and instrumentalist accounts.147 The first one 
views the rules on procedural fairness (including the rule against bias) as serving fundamental 
rights, values or ideals existing beyond the outcome of the decision-making process (such as 
the right to be treated with dignity and respect, a basic principle of non-arbitrariness, or the 
right to individual security). In this view, accuracy of procedures and outcomes is a 
prudential or derivative value, serving higher, first-order fundamental values.148 The second 
school of thought links procedural fairness with the quality of the outcome of the decision-
making process, and emphasises the importance of accuracy of this process. Galligan argued 
that the two approaches and rationales are in fact compatible. Adequate decision-making 
procedures ensures accuracy of decisions, which in turn promotes a multitude of first-order 
values. The ultimate objective of fair treatment and public confidence in the justice system is 
served by a cluster of values and standards of different kinds, each of which having a specific 
contribution. The specific contribution of the rule against bias is increased likelihood of 
accurate decisions, which in turn ensures that person’s rights and other normative 
expectations created by law should be respected.149   
  
5 The fiduciary no-conflict rule  
 
As the previous section showed, the rule against bias in public law is justified on the ground 
that bias or personal interest creates a risk that extraneous factors will be taken into account 
or will otherwise subconsciously skew the outcome of the decision-making process. The 
difficulty of detecting the extent of the influence of such factors is so great that a strict 
general rule insisting on evidence of a risk of partiality is justified. Thus, given the difficulty 
in detecting the error or distortion in the outcome of the judgment process, public confidence 
demands procedures which depend on proving not actual bias but the reasonable appearance 
of it. The key insight of this account is that the objective of promoting public confidence 
cannot be understood in isolation from the objective of ensuring accuracy of the decision-
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making process. Public confidence in the accuracy of procedures depends not on the 
guarantee that they lead in each case to the right outcomes, since that would be difficult to 
assess. Public confidence, instead, relates to the procedures being conducive to accurate 
results.150  
 
5.1 The concept of fiduciary conflict of interest  
 
As discussed in sections 2 and 3 above, the rule against bias and the fiduciary no-conflict rule 
share many commonalities, from a core objective of excluding vitiating considerations from 
the exercise of discretion, to potential joint historical roots. A point where the two doctrines 
seem to diverge is the dominant understanding of the purposes of these rules. While the rule 
against bias is generally justified as one of the safeguards of the decision-making process, the 
dominant justification for the fiduciary rule is the need to deter and discourage fiduciaries 
from abusing their position or from breaching their duties. As this section will show, the 
dominant, deterrence-based account of the purpose of the no-conflict rule is flawed for 
several reasons. First, by failing to connect self-interest with the core feature of exercise of 
discretion over the interests of others, the deterrence account is unable to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of why the no-conflict rule applies only in certain contexts (ie 
fiduciary relations) but not in similar contexts where one person has access to another’s assets 
and thus the opportunity to abuse his role at the expense of another (ie the cases of bare 
trustees, bailees, execution-only agents, bankers or mortgagees). Second, it struggles to 
explain why the good faith of the decision-maker or the absence of ostensible loss to the other 
party are irrelevant to the issue of liability, when a potential conflict of interest arises.151 The 
analogy with the rule against bias suggests that a different understanding of the notion of 
conflict of interest, namely as interaction between interest and decision-making process (as 
opposed to conflict between two diverging interests) is a more cogent foundation for 
understanding the purpose of the strict fiduciary duties.    
Fiduciary law does not normally use the notion of bias, with a few exceptions. In 
Parker v McKenna, for example, Lord Cairns LC stated that it is “utterly impossible” for 
                                                 
150 Galligan (n 8) at 72.  
151 For an in-depth critique of the deterrence accounts see Lionel Smith, ‘Deterrence, Prophylaxis and 
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directors having a conflict of interest “to exercise an independent and unbiased judgment”.152 
In Movitex v Bulfield, Vinelott J stated that a company has the right to the benefit of the 
“unbiased judgment” of its directors.153 The traditional and dominant way in which the 
fiduciary no-conflict rule is defined relies on the opposition between fiduciary’s 
impermissible interest and the interests of the beneficiary. This ‘conflicting interests’ account 
of the no-conflict rule is inveterate. It goes back to the decision in Aberdeen Railway Co v 
Blaikie Brothers, where Lord Cranworth referred to the possibility of conflicting interests as 
sufficient to trigger fiduciary’s liability:  
“[I]t is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge, 
shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal 
interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom 
he is bound to protect.”154 
 
The subsequent case law and literature on fiduciary conflicts of interest are marked by 
imprecise and inconsistent language.155 In a loose, but frequent formulation, the term conflict 
of interest is used to refer to situations in which the fiduciary’s personal interest and the 
interest of the beneficiary point in opposite directions.156 In a more precise approach, a 
conflict of interest is understood as the opposition between the fiduciary’s personal interest 
and his core duty to exercise judgment based on relevant considerations.157 More often, 
however, the duty side of the conflict of interest is interpreted broadly, as encompassing all 
other duties that a fiduciary owes to the beneficiary.158 Consequently, although it refers to a 
conflict between interest and duty, this understanding of a conflict of interest is very similar 
to the conflicting interests approach: the conflict is between the fiduciary’s self-interest and 
his duty to the beneficiaries.  
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 This account of the no-conflict rule is unsatisfactory and imprecise, because it does 
not connect the strict no-conflict rule with a core feature of the fiduciary relationship. In other 
words, it does not explain why this rule binds fiduciaries and not other persons, who may 
equally be tempted to promote their own interests, and have opportunities to do so at the 
expense of others. Examples of such situations include bare trustees, bailees or execution-
only agents, or providers of certain services such as mechanics or builders. The public law 
understanding of the rationale of the rule against bias could be instructive in this respect. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, the public law rule makes a stronger connection between 
impermissible external factor and risk of inaccurate decision-making process. This insight 
could easily be fitted into fiduciary law theory, by highlighting the importance of the 
discretionary power element of a fiduciary relation. 
Fiduciary law recognises, albeit insufficiently, the discretionary power to affect the 
legal or practical interests of another as a fundamental characteristic of fiduciary 
relationships.159 Weinrib, one of the first authors to engage in a general analysis of fiduciary 
obligations, emphasised that discretion is a core element in fiduciary law:  
“[F]iduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the control of… discretion… Two 
elements thus form the core of the fiduciary concept and these elements can also serve 
to delineate its frontiers. First, the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of 
discretion, and second, this discretion must be capable of affecting the legal position 
of the principal.”160 
 
In Galambos v Perez, the Supreme Court of Canada stressed that “[t]he particular 
relationships on which fiduciary law focuses are those in which one party is given a 
discretionary power to affect the legal or vital practical interests of another.”161 The 
discretionary fiduciary power gives its holder scope for judgment on how to promote the best 
interests of the beneficiary.162 The importance of undertaking and discretion has been restated 
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more recently in another unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. In Alberta v 
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, McLachlin C.J., writing for the Court, stated that, in 
order for ad hoc fiduciary duties to be imposed, the following elements must be present: (1) 
an undertaking by the alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or 
beneficiaries; (2) a defined person or class of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary’s control (the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries); and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary 
or beneficiaries that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary’s exercise of 
discretion or control.163 
Linking the no-conflict rule with the core feature of discretionary power provides a 
more accurate understanding of the rationale and purpose of the fiduciary no-conflict rule, 
along the lines of the rationale of the public law rule against bias. 
 
5.2 The test for potential conflicts of interest 
 
Subsequent interpretations and elaborations of the no-conflict rule retained, in general, the 
language of conflicting interests used in Aberdeen Railway. In Boardman v Phipps, a central 
issue was the definition of potential conflicts of interest, building on the “possibly may 
conflict” wording in Aberdeen Railway. Lord Hodson asserted that a fiduciary is liable to 
disgorge the profits whenever there was a mere possibility, even remote, that the fiduciary’s 
self-interest might conflict with his duty of loyalty: “even if the possibility of conflict is 
present between personal interest and the fiduciary position the rule of equity must be 
applied.”164 In contrast, Lord Upjohn, dissenting, took the view that a fiduciary should be 
compelled to disgorge the profits only where there has been a “real sensible possibility” of 
conflict of interest. In the circumstances, he considered that a possibility of conflict was too 
remote to render the alleged fiduciary liable:  
The phrase ‘possibly may conflict’ requires consideration. In my view it means that 
the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 
case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you 
could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in 
events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result 
in a conflict.165 
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Lord Upjohn’s view prevailed.166 In order for a fiduciary potential conflict of interest to exist, 
there must be a reasonable possibility of such conflict in the eyes of the reasonable man, not 
merely an appearance.167 His description of the potential conflict of interest, however, did not 
discuss what a situation of conflict of interest consists of, thus implicitly endorsing the 
‘conflicting interests’ approach from Aberdeen Railway.  
 A related feature of the no-conflict rule is that its application is strict. There are 
several aspects to this strictness. Liability for breach of fiduciary duty does not depend on the 
fiduciary’s good faith or actual motives, on the fact that the beneficiary has suffered no loss 
or has obtained a benefit following the conflicted transaction, or on the fact that the 
opportunity that the fiduciary has taken for himself was no longer available to the 
beneficiary. In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver, Lord Russell underlined the irrelevance of 
these factors for finding a breach of the proscriptive duties:  
“The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make a 
profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence 
of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as to whether the profit would 
or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a 
duty to obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or 
acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been 
damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit 
having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The profiteer, however honest and 
well intended, cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account.”168 
 
As this section shows, the fiduciary test for a potential conflict of interest and the public law 
test of apparent bias are substantively similar: they use the standard of the reasonable 
informed observer to determine whether a potential personal interest that the decision-maker 
                                                 
166 Although Lord Upjohn’s definition of a potential conflict of interest is dominant, it is not universally 
accepted. See e.g. Robert Pearce and Warren Barr, Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 7th ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 701.  
167 See Marks and Spencer plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer [2004] 3 All ER 773 at 777: “The cases establish 
that the potential conflict must be a reasonable apprehension of a potential conflict, not a mere theoretical 
possibility.” See also Donovan W.M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen and Lionel D. Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts in 
Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd, 2005) 918. 
168 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; [1967] 2 AC 134 at 144, emphasis added. See also Bray 
v. Ford [1896] AC 44 at 51, per Lord Herschell, underlining the irrelevance of good faith: “[The profit and conflict 
rules] might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, without any wrong being inflicted, 
and without any consciousness of wrong-doing.”  
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has in his exercise of discretion is sufficiently problematic to attract the application of the 
respective rules. In contrast with the rule against bias, which appears to make a clearer link 
between the potential influence on the interest on the accuracy of the decision-making 
process, the fiduciary standard seems to focus on the degree of opposition between the 
fiduciary’s personal interest, actual or potential, and the interest of the beneficiary. As the 
next section shows, this understanding is problematic. 
 
5.3 The purpose of the fiduciary no-conflict rule  
 
The idea that conflict of interest is concerned with the effect of personal interests on 
fiduciary’s judgment is not altogether absent from fiduciary law literature. It was recognised 
in early cases and texts.169 Unfortunately, commentators and judges have lost sight of this 
conception of conflicts of interest, as the policy justification of preserving the strictness of 
fiduciary duties in order to deter temptations of abuse gained primacy. This justification 
highlights the need to promote public confidence in fiduciary relationships by discouraging 
fiduciaries from being tempted to seek unauthorised benefits, and overcoming the evidentiary 
difficulties that courts could face in trying to uncover the existence or the extent of fiduciary 
wrongdoing.170 The focus on public confidence and removal of temptation led some scholars 
to argue for a more relaxed application of the fiduciary no-conflict and no-profit rules, where 
the fiduciary acted in good faith and the decision or transaction was ostensibly for the benefit 
of beneficiaries.171 
One strand of the argument is that the evidentiary difficulties reason traditionally 
invoked in support of the strict fiduciary duties is outdated. This reason for the strict fiduciary 
duties holds that it is difficult for the court to discover the background and facts of a 
conflicted transaction and much time would have to be spent in assessing whether the 
                                                 
169 For a detailed discussion see Valsan (n 1) at 15-24. 
170 Valsan (n 1) at 11-14. Robert Flannigan, ‘The Strict Character of Fiduciary Liability’ New Zealand Law 
Review (2006) 209 at 217; Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules’ Oregon Law Review 74 (1995) 
1209 at 1223-1225. Paul D. Finn is one of the most prominent proponents of public policy explanations of the 
strict fiduciary duties. He argued that the fiduciary principle is “an instrument of public policy, [which] has been 
used, and it is demonstrably used, to maintain the integrity, credibility and utility of relationships perceived to 
be of importance in society. And it is used to protect interests, both personal and economic, which the society 
deems valuable… [A]s perceptions of social interests and values change so also can the ambience of the 
fiduciary principle itself.” (Paul D. Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T.G. Youdan, Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trust (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 1 at 26). 
171 Criticism of the rigid application of fiduciary rules is commonly directed at the no-profit rule. Whether the 
no-conflict and no-profit rules are entirely separate is a hotly debated issue in fiduciary law. The general view, 
to which this paper subscribes, is that unauthorised benefits are simply an instance of impermissible interests, 
and thus fall within the broader no-conflict rule.  
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transaction was fair.172 In Murad v Al-Saraj,173 for instance, Arden LJ stated, in obiter, that 
whilst evidentiary difficulties relating to breach of the no-profit rule would have been 
relevant many decades ago, modern courts do not face such problems. She argued that the 
time may have come for courts to “revisit the operation of the inflexible rule of equity in 
harsh circumstances”, and exclude liability when the trustee or other fiduciary has acted in 
perfect good faith and without any deception or concealment, and in the belief that he was 
acting in the best interests of the beneficiary.174 In the same decision Parker LJ made a 
similar argument for reviewing the harsh application of the no-conflict rule:  
“there can be little doubt that the inflexibility of the ‘no conflict’ rule may… work 
harshly so far as the fiduciary is concerned. It may be said… that that is the inevitable 
and intended consequence of the deterrent nature of the rule. On the other hand, it 
may be said that commercial conduct which in 1874 was thought to imperil the safety 
of mankind may not necessarily be regarded nowadays with the same depth of 
concern. So, like Arden LJ… I can envisage the possibility that at some time in the 
future the House of Lords may consider that the time has come to relax the severity of 
the ‘no conflict’ rule to some extent in appropriate cases.”175 
 
Sealy argued that courts today face “no evidentiary problem”176 in discovering whether a 
fiduciary acted against the interests of the beneficiary, whilst Edmunds and Lowry contend 
that evidentiary hurdles “need not pose any insurmountable obstacles”.177 Jones advocated 
for courts to decide on liability for breach of the no-conflict rule on an ad hoc basis, in order 
to help to remove the harsh elements of the fiduciary rules, and ensure that honest and 
dedicated fiduciaries are not unjustly punished.178 Similarly, the Scottish Law Commission 
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175 Ibid. at [121]. 1874 and “the safety of mankind” are references to Parker v McKenna (1874) LR 10 Ch App 
96 at 124-125, per W. M. James LJ. This expression was used by older fiduciary cases. See e.g. Ex parte 
Bennett, (1805) 10 Ves Jun 382 at 385-396, where Lord Eldon commented that the fiduciary no-conflict rule 
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176 Len S Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality (1984) 40. 
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Orthodoxy of Absolutism’ Journal of Business Law (2000) 122 at 139. See also S Panesar, ‘The Nature of 
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stated that a potential option for reform of trustees’ fiduciary duties would be for courts to 
relax the fiduciary rules “on a case-by-case basis”.179 In a subsequent report, the Commission 
recommended a joint-interest approach to trustees’ fiduciary duty, whereby the court could 
exonerate a trustee from liability for breach of fiduciary duty if the trustee acted honestly in 
the interests of the trust and the transaction was fair.180 Langbein put forward a similar 
proposal in the context of US trust law.181 He averred that “a revolution in fact-finding” 
reduced the concerns regarding concealment of trustee misbehaviour, implying that the 
evidentiary-based justification is no longer powerful.182 Consequently, the no further inquiry 
rule183 must be replaced with a regime that allows trustees to retain profits obtained from 
their position, as long as they can prove, if challenged in court, that the conflicted transaction 
was prudently undertaken in the beneficiary’s best interest.184 
 These arguments for relaxing the strict no-conflict fiduciary rule are plausible if the 
notion of conflict of interest is understood as ‘conflicting interests’, namely opposition 
between the individual interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiary. In such an approach, it is 
reasonable to argue that a rule imposing liability when a potential conflict of interest arises, 
irrespective of the fiduciary’s good faith or intention to benefit the beneficiary (as it was the 
case in many foundational fiduciary cases, such as Aberdeen Railway,185 Regal Hastings,186 
or Boardman187) may be anachronistic and unduly harsh. When conflict of interest is 
regarded as a situation where personal interest creates a risk of unreliable judgment, thus 
affecting the accuracy of the decision process in ways that are hard to observe or correct, the 
need to maintain the strict fiduciary rule is easier to comprehend and advocate. In a similar 
vein, the parallel with the rule against bias brings new insights into the irrelevance of the 
                                                 
179 Scottish Law Commission, 2003. ‘Discussion Paper on Breach of Trust’ 37.  
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decision-maker’s good faith and proper motivation: bias is an “insidious thing” 188 that may 




The dominant fiduciary law view on the purpose of the no-conflict rule explains the 
prohibition of self-interest mostly as a means to discipline fiduciaries who are tempted to 
abuse their position for their own benefit. In the public law literature on the rule against bias, 
in contrast, the prohibition of having a personal interest in the outcome of a decision is linked 
primarily to the need to ensure that judicial or administrative decision-makers do not stray, 
consciously or unconsciously, from their core duty to exercise impartial and independent 
judgment. Although impartiality of judgment is not the main concern of fiduciary law, the 
essence of the two instances of conflict of interest is ultimately the same: when a duty to 
decide over the interests of another based on pre-defined standards exists, the interference of 
personal interests and preferences can alter the decision-making process and cause a breach 
of this duty.  
The two rules have a similar approach to identifying potential or apparent conflicts of 
interest. The fair-minded informed observer test of apparent bias is remarkably similar to the 
‘reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances’ test for determining the 
possibility of a fiduciary conflict of interest. The similarity between the two tests goes 
beyond mere language. The common language reflects a similar methodology in determining 
possible conflicts of interest and, respectively, situations of bias.  In contrast to the rules 
against bias, the fiduciary no-conflict rule suffers from an inadequate understanding of a 
conflict of interest situation. Although discretion is generally recognised as a central feature 
of a fiduciary relation, the link between interest and discretion is nearly absent. De-coupling 
the extraneous interest from proper exercise of judgment has the undesirable consequence of 
making possible the argument that the no-conflict rule should be relaxed by removing 
fiduciary liability where the fiduciary acted in good faith and the decision or transaction was 
in the best interests of the beneficiary.  
This paper argued that fiduciary law theory could benefit from a more sophisticated 
understanding of the content and purpose of the no-conflict rule. The fair-minded and 
informed observer standard applied in judicial review of administrative decisions and the 
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justifications for the rule against bias provide useful comparative insights. The public law 
rule and test acknowledge more clearly the risk of unreliable or impartial decision-making 
process caused by the interfering impermissible factor. The idea that self-interest interferes 
with the proper exercise of judgment has been present in the fiduciary law theory and court 
opinions since the earliest developments of the rules governing fiduciaries. The early 
references to the prohibition of being judge in one’s cause, and the occasional mentioning of 
the weakness of the human mind to resist the influence of self-interest, suggest that courts 
may have been aware of the risk of unreliable judgment caused by conflicts of interest and 
difficulties of proving or measuring this risk. Early in the development of the no-conflict rule, 
however, the connection between a fiduciary’s personal interests and his exercise of 
judgment in another’s interest was overshadowed by ‘deterrence’ and ‘evidentiary 
difficulties’ as principal justifications of the existence and strictness of fiduciary duties. Thus, 
fiduciary law lost sight of the intimate connection between reliability of judgment and the 
presence of conflicting interests.  
    
